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1. - Introduction
In my lecture today, I use the words «New Millennium» in or-
der to emphasize that the international monetary system evolves
slowly and that long-term predictions about it must be rooted in
history. By looking at the evolution of the international monetary
system in its historical context, we can find laws that inform us
about the future. That is what I hope to accomplish in this An-
gelo Costa Lecture, named in honor of an Italian who made great
contributions to the recovery of the economy of Italy in the post-
war period.
In every stage of history, political and economic events have
been intermingled, and nowhere does the link become more ob-
vious than in the field of monetary actions. Actions affecting the
international monetary system have been both cause and effect in
political and economic events. The monetary world belongs to
both politics and economics.
In this lecture I want to use theory, history and politics to un-
cover monetary changes that have produced interactions between
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forecast events that illuminate our understanding and point out
desirable directions in the future. How is the international mon-
etary system evolving and how can we expedite its progress into
desirable channels?
2. - The International Gold Standard
My Nobel Lecture, presented in Stockholm on December 8,
1999, was entitled A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century. It
was the last Nobel Memorial Lecture in the twentieth century and
that gave me license for the ambitious title and the first oppor-
tunity to speak about century as a whole. My basic thesis was that
political and economic events had interacted with one another as
both cause and effect and that this two-way interaction found its
manifestation in the state of the international monetary system.
I divided the century into three almost equal parts. The first
third was concerned with the gold standard, its successful opera-
tion up to World War I, its breakdown in that catastrophe, its re-
vival in the 1920s, followed by its collapse in the 1930s. The sec-
ond third was connected with the dollar standard, anchored to
gold from 1934 until its breakdown in 1971. The last third en-
compassed the era of flexible exchange rates and ended effective-
ly in 1999, when the introduction of the euro inaugurated a new
monetary arrangement revolving around currency areas.
The international gold standard in force in most of the world
at the beginning of the 20th century was a highly efficient inter-
national monetary system. Different versions of it or of bimet-
allism had been in force for over twenty- five centuries. Most of
the great empires in history had used gold or silver in their mon-
etary systems and their coinages had typically become the units
most widely used in international trade.
The gold standard as it had developed at the turn of the 20th
century gave the world a high degree of economic stability, high em-
ployment, low inflation rates and fairly rapid economic growth. It
was globalization, with relatively free trade, substantial capital mo-
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context of a long era of peace called the pax Britannica. It was high-
ly Euro-centric with colonial empires managed from that continent,
and Europe, as Max Weber put it, the «mistress of the world.»
The international gold standard could only be maintained on
the basis of a few fixed points of policy. One was the requirement
of fiscal stability. The main axiom of public finance was to keep
the budget balanced; if the public debt had to be run up during
a war, fiscal prudence dictated that it be brought down after the
war. Two other dicta concluded the triumvirate of absolutes: don’t
tamper with gold and don’t change exchange rates. The gold price,
exchange rates and budget balance were parameters, not instru-
ments of policy, and expectations about them were fixed.
Few international monetary systems have been war-proof. In
fact it was widely believed that war was ruled out because it might
threaten to upset the gold standard! None the less, it did break
down, as an international standard, in World War I. Most of the
belligerents went off gold, which came to and was monetized in
the United States, leading to a doubling of the dollar price level
between 1914 and 1920.
Despite a sharp deflation in 1921, the dollar price level in the
1920s was still 30% above its 1914 level. It was at that high price
level that gold came to be restored-by all the major countries in
the 1920s. The return to the gold standard increased gold re-
quirements in the system and raised its value, i.e. it caused de-
flation. All the major countries suffered deflation in the order of
30% between 1930 and 1933, forcing most countries, including
Britain and the United States off the restored gold standard, re-
sulting in a new international monetary system.
3. - The Gold-Dollar Standard and Problem of Gold Converti-
bility
Long before 1934 the United States had become the largest
economy in the world, and by 1914 it was larger than the next
three largest economies, Britain, Germany and France, put to-
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US monetary power became activated, and ever since the United
States was able to play a determining role in the international
monetary system. Dollar prices had become «world» prices and
money increasingly came to mean the dollar. The gold standard
that had been reinstated in the 1920s broke down not because of
a mistake in setting the dollar-sterling exchange rate, but because
gold liquidity at the post-war dollar price level, more than 30%
above its pre-war level, was too low for the higher gold require-
ments of the restored system. The consequence was deflation on
a scale never before experienced in the world economy.
The new international monetary system began in the years
1934-1936 when the United States in 1934 devalued the dollar,
raising the price of gold from $20.67 an ounce to $35 an ounce.
In the next two years a semblance of the international version of
the gold standard remained, with France hanging on to an over-
valued franc, but in 1936 France was forced to devalue. The Tri-
partite Agreement signed in that year by the United States, Britain
and France specified that the three countries notify each other in
advance of any change in exchange rates, and that agreement an-
ticipated somewhat the arrangements made at the Bretton Woods
conference in 1944. Significantly, however, it was now dollar, not
gold exchange rates, that were relevant.
The United States fixed the price of gold but the new system
was not a real gold standard. In the first place, it was not truly in-
ternational. The United States was the only major country fixing the
price of gold, and it was convertible only for foreign monetary au-
thorities. Second, American citizens were prohibited from holding
gold, which was now centralized in Fort Knox and the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York. Third, US monetary policy was de-coupled
from gold movements by sterilization operations, with the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York matching gold purchases with sales of
government bonds, and gold sales with bond purchases. This meant
that there was no longer an automatic adjustment mechanism in
operation. In the future gold convertibility could be sustained only
if discretionary Federal Reserve actions were directed at maintain-
ing gold equilibrium rather than the dollar price level.
10 Robert A. MundellThe Bretton Woods conference put a legal veneer on the gold-
dollar standard that had evolved. The unit of account of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund was 1/35 of an ounce or .888671 grams of
gold, equivalent to the «1944 gold dollar.» Member countries were
required to keep exchange rates within 1% of its established gold
parity and, with the exception of the United States, all the major
countries satisfied that rule by keeping their market exchange rates
within 1% of the dollar parity. The United States, which historically
had rarely intervened in the foreign exchange market, satisfied the
requirement by stipulating that it was fixing the price of gold. It
was an asymmetrical system, with the advantage that it took ac-
count of the dominant position of the dollar in the world econo-
my, but the disadvantage that there was no mechanism that could
ensure long run gold convertibility of the dollar.
The Bretton Woods agreement represented a compromise be-
tween a gold standard and a dollar standard, a hybrid system in
which both gold and dollars were used as reserves and there was
a division of commitments and power. The United States would
commit to fix the dollar to gold (or gold to the dollar); the other
countries would fix their currencies to the dollar. Power in the
system lay importantly with the United States, but it was by no
means unchecked. In the short run the United States could dom-
inate the global inflation rate, the other large countries could ex-
ert control over the US gold stock and threaten US ability to main-
tain gold convertibility.
4. - The Breakdown of the Fixed Exchange Rate System
When monetary relations between America and Europe be-
came tense in the 1960s—British Prime Minister Wilson called it a
monetary war—it seemed that the threats might be played out. But
there were great risks involved. As a consequence of the inflations
of World War II, the Korean War and the Viet-Nam War, gold had
become undervalued. Since 1950 the United States had become a
net seller of gold from its stocks, which had peaked at about of 70%
of world monetary stocks in 1948. Would the United States contin-
The International Monetary System at the New Millennium 11ue to honor its pledge to convert gold at $35? If Europe exercised
its full power to convert dollars into gold, the United States might
end its commitment and bring down the system. It seemed now un-
likely that that outcome would benefit Europe.
In the late 1960s, the US inflation rate had increased, em-
barrassing Europe with the need to buy excess dollars, creating
an «overhang» of dollars. The problem was aggravated by the US
recession of 1970-1971, which brought about a large capital out-
flow from the United States, which, in turn fed an explosion of
liquidity growth in the Eurodollar market. Germany tried to re-
verse the influx of reserves by investing dollars in the London mar-
ket, but this only exacerbated the explosion of liquidity.
By the summer of 1971 what appeared to be a dollar crisis
was emerging and the Joint Economic Committee of the US Con-
gress recommended devaluation of the dollar. Some European
countries asked to convert dollars into gold. The United States
then brought the post-war international system to an end.
The systemic crisis of 1971 was met with inconvertibility of
the dollar, a unilateral action of the United States, when President
Richard M. Nixon took the dollar off gold. The other major coun-
tries then took their currencies off the dollar.
The United States had other options. One alternative would
have been to double or (better) triple the dollar price of gold. Such
a policy would have preserved the system — at least for a couple
of decades or so. By this time, however, the United States had
come to perceive that the international monetary system was now
benefiting the rest of the world more than the United States. Eu-
rope was bent on creating a rival to the dollar in the form of a
new European currency and that would be easier to do with the
fixed exchange system intact. While the United States had not yet
made up its mind whether it wanted to encourage or discourage
a European money — the decision had been made to «benign ne-
glect» the issue — why should it continue to smooth the path for
it by keeping the system intact?
Of course there were other reasons for rejecting an increase
in the price of gold. First, the United States had encouraged coun-
tries to hold dollars rather than gold, and an increase in the price
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would benefit the two biggest gold-producing countries: South Af-
tica, with its noxious system of apartheid, and the Soviet Union,
the US enemy in the Cold War. Third, an increase in the price of
gold might create a new «Golden Avalanche» — the influx of gold
to the United States of the type that occurred in the late 1930s —
or, on the other hand, it might establish expectations that it might
be repeated in a decade or so. While these arguments were not
overwhelming — and Arthur Burns, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, strongly believed in maintaining convertibility and
raising the price of gold — it would have been difficult to get agree-
ment among the major players in Nixon’s cabinet. The decision to
take the dollar off gold and risk floating seemed politically easier.
There are of course alternative views of the crisis. Many Eu-
ropeans thought the crisis occurred because of the US balance of
payments deficit. Yet the US deficit was itself part of the system.
With little or no gold entering the system, an increase in foreign
exchange reserves was needed to keep pace with non-inflationary
growth and the dollar was the currency most needed in foreign
exchange reserves.
5. - The Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement
The demise of Bretton Woods and flexible exchange rates
brought pressure on the international monetary authorities to an-
nounce that a new «system» had come into being to replace the one
that had just been disbanded. This pressure led, in 1976, to the Sec-
ond Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement endorsing man-
aged flexible exchange rates — dirty floating. Ever since that date
the International Monetary Fund has been waging a battle to desta-
bilize the external values of the currencies of member countries
1.
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1 One of the first casualties of the new dispensation was Mexico, which had
had a fixed exchange rate at 12.5 pesos = $1 from 1954 until 1976. The 1976 de-
valuation and flexible exchange rates inaugurated a period of monetary instabili-
ty from which Mexico has not yet recovered. The destabilization of Mexico was
soon followed by IMF-sponsored destabilization of the currencies of many other
countries in Central America.The IMF was not always so enthusiastic about flexible ex-
change rates. Before 1971 staff members were instructed to sup-
port fixed exchange rate systems. Fixed exchange rates were de-
fended and flexible rates ridiculed in the IMF Annual Reports of
1950 and 1962
2.
The shift to flexible exchange rates did not occur as a result
of any fundamental new idea or IMF study. Of course the idea it-
self of stabilizing some index of the price level instead of the ex-
change rate or gold has an old history, harking back to ancient
times. In the modem era it started perhaps in Swedish history
during and after the wars with Russia in the 18
th century and in
British history after the Napoleonic Wars
3. In the early decades
of the 20
th century, both Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes
had supported price stabilization as a preferable target to gold or
exchange rate stabilization and Keynes had constructed, in the pit
of the great depression, an index of commodity prices that he
thought could be used as a target for stabilization in an interna-
tional monetary system. The emphases in these cases, however,
were in finding an antidote to a potential or actual instability of
gold.
Frank Graham, Charles Whittlesey, James Meade and Milton
Friedman, writing independently in the 1940s and 1950s, brought
the case for flexible exchange rates into modem literature, but for
very different reasons: Graham and Whittlesey wanted to decou-
ple the dollar from gold to prevent what they called the «Golden
Avalanche». In the post-war world, Friedman argued for flexible
exchange rates as a preferable alternative to exchange controls,
and Meade argued for flexible exchange rates as a means by which
a socialist government could better manage Britain’s economy.
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2 Parenthetically, I should note that I was a member of the staff of the IMF
when the 1962 Annual Report came, out, and I objected to some of the arguments
used to attack flexible exchange rates and support fixed exchange rates, largely be-
cause the drafters of the report had not taken into account the important issue of
currency areas, along the lines of MUNDELL R., «A Theory of Optimum Currency
Areas» The American Economic Review, LI, n. 4, November 1961, pp. 509-17.
3 Per Christiansen of Sweden in the 1760s and Thomas Attwood of Britain af-
ter 1815 both advocated stabilization of a domestic price level rather than the gold
price.None of these arguments were very relevant to the world econo-
my and the international monetary system in the 1970s. Moreover,
Milton Friedman rejected flexible exchange rates as unsuitable for
the developing countries and Meade came to accept a European
currency as a good idea
4. 
Moreover, support for flexible exchange rates has dropped
even by those most responsible for putting them into effect. The
agreement to move to flexible exchange rates was a decision
made in 1973 largely by three men, George Schultz, US Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Giscard d’Estaing, Minister of Finance in
France, and Helmut Schmidt, Minister of Finance in Germany.
George Schultz was a distinguished labor economist and had
been colleague of Milton Friedman (and myself) at the Univer-
sity of Chicago in the 1960s, and went on to become Secretary
of Treasury and Secretary of State in the Nixon and Reagan cab-
inets respectively. Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt went on to be-
come, respectively, President of France and Chancellor of W.
Germany. Subsequently, both Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt
have realized that the move to flexible exchange rates was a mis-
take.
A distinction here has to be made between the position of
the United States and the countries in the rest of the world. It
can be argued that a move to flexible exchange rates could ben-
efit the United States and enhance the role of the dollar. Not so
for Europe or the rest of the world. Already Europe had em-
barked on its project for monetary union, set to be achieved by
the year 1980. The European economies in the 1950s, 1960s and
early 1970s, with currencies fixed to the dollar, had achieved a
high degree of economic convergence of inflation rates and in-
terest rates. The abandonment of the dollar anchor for their cur-
rencies undermined progress toward monetary union. Monetary
union in Europe, which was set to be a ten-year project, com-
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4 For a fairly up-to-date review of Friedman’s (and my) view see «The Nobel
Monetary Duel», a debate between Milton Friedman and myself in the National
Post of Canada, December 2000, available on the internet, at http://www.national-
post.com/features/duel.pleted in 1980, took an additional two decades because of the
break-up of the international monetary system
5.
The movement to flexible exchange rates in the 1970s was
completely different from earlier episodes. In the past, countries
have been forced off existing exchange rate parities because of
external shocks, hyperinflation or fiscal instability. Some ele-
ments of flexible exchange rates are likely to be inherent in every
pluralistic international monetary system. Neither the bimetallic
or gold standard systems of earlier centuries nor the postwar
economic system is an exception. But the 1970s inaugurated a
new era. For the first time in world history, the absence of an
international monetary system and exchange rate fluctuation
came to be regarded as the norm of correct behaviour and the
International Monetary Fund persists to this day in applauding
countries that destabilize. This new norm of behaviour was de-
veloped without any coherent prior analysis or comprehensive
economic theory. There was, indeed, a scramble of internation-
al monetary conferences to organize a consensus on how the
arrangements could be expected to operate.
6. - Why Currency Areas Break Down
The post-war arrangements, like the gold standard, repre-
sented a currency area that broke down because the conditions
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5 The answer was sought in a joint float of the European currencies against
the dollar. This idea had been first broached after August 15, 1971, when Presi-
dent Nixon took the dollar off gold, but the European countries could not at that
time agree on which of the European currencies — the major candidates were the
pound, the mark and the franc — could act as a pivot. The issue came up again
in the spring of 1973. But even at that stage the British and French were unwill-
ing to acknowledge that the mark had become the second most important cur-
rency in the world and would be the natural and most effective pivot for a joint
float. At that time an Economic Study Group (of which I was a member) had been
set up in 1973 by the European Commission to advise on the monetary union pro-
ject and we were asked whether a joint float could be organized without naming
one of the three main candidates as leader. Our answer was yes, but while it was
not incorrect as a theoretical matter, it was not a practical alternative in the time
period involved. The major political problem, acknowledgement of the dominant
role of the mark, was not finally acknowledged by France until the mid-1980s.and consensus required for it to survive no longer existed. A cur-
rency area is by definition a zone of fixed exchange rates. What
are the conditions for creating or maintaining a currency area?
Six conditions are needed to maintain a currency area:
1) agreement on a common inflation target or on a mecha-
nism (e.g., the gold standard, or the interests of a hegemonic
power) for determining the inflation rate; 2) agreement on a com-
mon measure of inflation (a price index with common weights,
such as the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) con-
structed by Eurostat for the EMU); 3) a mechanism for locking
exchange rates, including a division of responsibilities for fixing
and a commitment to use monetary policy to keep the exchange
rate an equilibrium rate; 4) consensus on a common monetary
policy (including the possibility of a dominated system); 5) fis-
cal solvency of each country in the currency area; and 6) con-
sensus on the mechanism for dividing seigniorage.
Many currency areas have existed without specific agree-
ments on a common inflation rate, accepting, sometimes out of
inertia, the status quo with respect to the division of responsi-
bilities or benefits. A currency area that is ranged around a
strong anchor country, for example, may accept the monetary
leadership of the pivot currency, while the small countries as-
sume the responsibility of keeping the exchange rate fixed. Un-
der these circumstances a currency area can break up because
the inflation outcome is no longer acceptable.
There are many different types of currency relations within a
currency area as there are political relations. But the viability of
most currency areas can be discussed in terms of the above-men-
tioned six conditions. Let me here just note a few of the major
systems.
The gold standard was a currency area in which the inflation
rate was ultimately deterinined by conditions in the gold market,
including the vicissitudes of gold mining discoveries and tech-
niques, disturbances associated with countries going onto or off
the gold standard. As it turned out, the real value of gold had a
remarkable long-run stability in the five centuries up to the out-
break of World War I, but with troublesome long swings of in-
The International Monetary System at the New Millennium 17creases in the price level alternating with periods of decreases in
the price level.
Politically, the gold standard had the merit of being a sym-
metric system, with no need for a dominant country. In practice,
one country might have turned out to have been «more equal than
the others» as was the case with Spain in the 16
th and 17
th cen-
turies, France in the 18
th century, Britain in the 19
th century and
the United States in the 20
th century. The seigniorage issue was
not such a bone of contention under the gold standard because
much of it was dissipated in costs of production.
As the gold standard evolved in the twentieth century, its sta-
bility, as already noted, came to depend increasingly on the poli-
cies of the United States with respect to gold. The gold standard
could work with the «rules of the game» in force primarily be-
cause the largest country, the United States, did not have a cen-
tral bank; US monetary policy was automatic. But with the cre-
ation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, the United States ac-
quired the power to manipulate the system, decoupling, when nec-
essary, monetary policy from gold flows. In fact this possibility
became institutionalized after the devaluation of 1934 when the
United States began to sterilize the monetary effects of all gold
flows.
Under the post-war international monetary system endorsed
at Bretton Woods, there was no explicit agreement on a common
inflation rate, but it was hoped and perhaps expected that US
monetary policy, checked by the requirement that the dollar be
convertible (for foreign monetary authorities), would result in a
stable US price level that would set the standard for the rest of
the world. Although the arrangement was asymmetric, there was
an exchange of obligations. The other countries kept their cur-
rencies tied to the dollar while the United States formally com-
mitted itself to buying and selling gold freely at the official price.
In theory such an arrangement should have been self-equili-
brating. In practice, however, the United States had, by its steril-
ization policy, divorced monetary policy from movements in its
gold stock. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had been in-
structed to sterilize the monetary effects of gold sales by buying
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leaving its monetary policy to be entirely discretionary and, as it
turned out, suited to the wishes of the US government. The mon-
etary policy conducted by the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Com-
mittee was entirely discretionary and, for better or worse, domi-
nated by domestic objectives. In the absence of sterilization, the
shoe would have been on the other foot and the Committee would
have had to take explicit action to sterilize.
7. - Currency Areas and the Dollar
Few events in international monetary history were as poorly
prepared as the move to flexible exchange rates. There had been
little scientific work in theory, history or econometrics on how a
generalized arrangement of flexible exchange rates would be like-
ly to work. It was universally acknowledged that cleanly floating
exchange rates would be a disaster, and the addition of the qual-
ifying adjective «managed» turned out to be a diplomat’s dream:
«Managed flexible,» could be taken to mean anything at all.
It is a pity that before the Second Amendment was adopted
endorsing managed flexible exchange rates, there was no large
preparatory Bretton Woods style conference assessing whether it
was a good idea and whether it suited the interests of any coun-
try except the United States. Repeated calls for a «new interna-
tional monetary order» fell on deaf ears.
In the abstract, a move to floating exchange rates — howev-
er managed — could have led to chaos. How flexible exchange
rate would operate in practice depended on the size configuration
of economies. Imagine a world of two hundred economies of iden-
tical size! What a calamity for trade and payments and chaos to
financial markets! There would be 1/2 x 200 x 199 spot exchange
rates alone and complete chaos. The incentive to create a com-
mon international money, reactivate gold, or form large currency
areas would be irresistible.
What saved the regime from chaos was the presence of the
dollar, which, despite the resentment its dominance inspired, gave
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countries were willing to use the dollar as the international cur-
rency, they would have close to a universal unit of account. Were
it not for political considerations, seigniorage and the possibility
that the United States might impose an inflation tax on the rest
of the world, a world currency system based on the dollar would
be as close to an optimal system as a world lacking political in-
tegration could expect.
The  pons asinorum of a global currency area based on the
dollar would be the choice of monetary policy by the United
States. Let us suppose the United States adopted an inflation tar-
get of, say, 1-3 % for the United States and that the United States
represents one quarter of the world economy. Would that prove
to be acceptable to the rest of the world? It would be hard to
imagine a better international monetary system.
Of course there would be problems. If the US grew very rapid-
ly in its international sector relative to the rest of the world, its
real exchange rate would have to appreciate, and if the required
annual appreciation exceeded 3%, price levels would have to drop
in the rest of the world. In the opposite case, if the US real ex-
change rate had to depreciate, prices in the rest of the world would
have to rise more rapidly than in the United States. Yet these prob-
lems would be minor relative to those that have arisen due to
large gyrations in exchange rates.
By far the main problem, however, is the political issue of
dominance. A global dollar standard would involve a substantial
increase in the dominance of the US power position in the world
economy. Once on the dollar standard, countries would be more
vulnerable to small changes in US policy. It is conceivable that
the United States might take advantage of its quasi-monopoly po-
sition and raise its inflation rate, imposing an «optimal inflation
tax» on the rest of the world, as it arguably did, whether inten-
tionally or by inadvertence, in the 1970s.
Patterns of dominance lead to frictions, resistances and coun-
tervailing alliances. In the 1970s the United States, festering from
the psychological wounds of the Viet-Nam War, was not in the
mood for a cooperative solution even if one had been proposed.
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tion in a countervailing alternative, what became the euro.
8. - The Advent of the Euro
The significance of the euro lies in the fact that it has the
potential to change the power configuration of the internation-
al monetary system and to vie with the dollar as an alternative
unit of account and reserve currency. In this sense it might be
more important than the breakdown of the system in the early
1970s.
Upon its creation in 1999, the euro was instantly the number
two currency in the world. By the middle of 2002, the physical
currency and coins will have replaced the currencies of the twelve
countries that make up the euro area, countries with a combined
GDP of $6 trillion. When Sweden, Denmark and especially Britain
join the euro zone — as seems probable — the euro area will have
a combined GDP of 75% of the dollar area (at current exchange
rates). The admittance of the accession countries to the European
Union and possibly the eurozone will probably mean another
dozen countries added to the euro area in the next decade, not to
mention thirteen CIA franc countries of West Africa that are al-
ready tied to the euro through the former connections of this cur-
rency with the French franc.
Counting a few other countries that are likely to tie their cur-
rencies to the euro zone in the coming decade, we could expect
as many as 40-50 countries with a population approaching 500
million, with a GDP perhaps 20% larger than the United States,
in the eurozone or tied to the euro within the next decade. This
will produce a basic change in the power configuration of the sys-
tem, with some shift of monetary and trade power from the Unit-
ed States to the EU. Although the United States, taking into ac-
count its military power and centralized decision-making process,
will continue to be the only superpower for the foreseeable fu-
ture, the euro area will grow in relative importance, creating the
prospect of a shift from active unilateralism to a more coopera-
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age and power. A multi-polar power system will have a chance to
develop.
Is this estimate of the importance of the euro exaggerated?
The euro has some defects to contend with. One is its weakness
since it was introduced. A second is the reluctance of Britain to
throw in its lot with its continental partners. A third is the prob-
lems of a system with one money but twelve governments. A fourth
is the problem of decision-making and governance. A fifth is the
weakness caused by the accession of low-income countries. A sixth
is the sluggishness of structural reform of labor markets, compe-
tition laws and tax systems. A seventh is the relatively slow pen-
etration of Information Technology throughout Southern Europe.
The important truth in these objections provide an agenda for re-
form in Europe in the years to come.
There is, nevertheless, a bottom line that the euro was all but
a political necessity. It is the only game in town. Whenever fac-
tors tend to make it weak, countervailing forces will at the same
time be set in motion to help it recover. That has happened time
and again over the past three decades since the process of mon-
etary integration began. There will be crises in the future to deal
with as well, but it is extremely unlikely that a solution will lie in
disbanding an effort that has taken decades to build. The Euro-
pean Union is going to become bigger and more important for
the world economy.
9. - The Demonstration Effect of the Euro
By 2012, the importance of the dollar and euro will probably
be about equal and countries may want to hold about equal pro-
portion of dollars and euros. What are the implications? Given
that most of the existing reserves are now in dollars, a balance
between dollars and euros would mean little if any growth in de-
mand for dollars over the next decade but a substantial demand
for euros. If the past is any indication, the global demand for re-
serves will double over the next dozen years, say from $1.6 tril-
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6. With, say, three quarters of reserves in dol-
lars today and in dollars and euro in 2012, there would be no
room for dollar growth but a demand for euros of $1.2 trillion,
or $100 billion a year. With unchanged capital movements, this
would involve a substantial turnaround in current account and
trade balances, with the United States generating a smaller deficit
and Europe a larger deficit or smaller surplus. Most likely the
change in reserve would be split between changes in current ac-
counts and capital movements. In any case it would involve down-
ward long-run pressure on the dollar and a factor making for the
long-run strength of the euro.
Another consequence of the euro needs to be considered. The
euro will have an important demonstration effect, changing the
way people think about flexible exchange rates and currency ar-
eas. Consider the fact that the International Monetary Fund and
the United States have together been preaching to countries
throughout the world for two and a half decades about the im-
portance of destabilizing their exchange rates, and the calamities
visited on countries that failed to do so
7.
Then suddenly the euro emerges, and it is seen to be a great
success. Instead of the fixed exchange rates in the euro zone cre-
ating speculative capital movements, they are eliminated com-
pletely; hedge funds can’t make a dime in the euro zone. Interest
rates, which in several EU countries were between 10-15% ten
years ago, suddenly dropped below 5%. Europeans suddenly had
a capital market of continental dimensions and a currency that is
the second most important currency in the world. The success of
the euro zone has made smaller countries look freshly at the ex-
change regimes sponsored by the IMF. «If the euro is right for 11
(now 12) most advanced countries in the world, why not for oth-
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6 More probably, however, the demand for reserves will grow at a consider-
ably slower rate if not absolutely decline. This is because the global demand for
reserves is a function of the number of currency areas, diminishing as larger cur-
rency areas are formed.
7 Guillermo Ortiz, the Governor of the Bank of Mexico, when he spoke at the
World Economic Forum in Davos in the year 2000, was only expressing the new
conventional «wisdom» when he said something to the effect that if the Asian Cri-
sis taught us anything, it is that fixed exchange rate systems don’t work.er countries? If it is right for Europe to scrap its national cur-
rencies, why is it wrong for other countries to do the same thing?»
10. - Three Islands of Price Stability
The advent of the euro has brought about a change in the
perception of the international monetary system. No one believes
any longer in the likelihood of universal flexible exchange rates.
We now have three dominant monetary blocs, the dollar area, the
euro area, and the yen area, which together make up a transac-
tions domain that represents well over half the world economy. It
is not possible to talk about the architecture of the international
monetary system outside the context of what happens to these
three currency areas. It is more than likely that new currency ar-
eas will form, reducing the number of currency areas significant-
ly and perhaps even reducing the number of currencies.
Of course currency areas are not fixed in stone. They evolve
with economic and political changes. Down the road, other cur-
rencies will be important. The Chinese renminbi (RMB, or yuan)
could at some point become a fourth currency if current expec-
tations about growth in China materialize and convertibility is es-
tablished. But at the present, we have to deal with the reality of
these three important currency areas, and we also have to deal
with the high degree of instability of the dollar, euro and yen ex-
change rates.
The instability of the exchange rates is in sharp contrast to
the internal stability each of the currency areas has achieved. The
U.S. inflation rate has been consistently below 3% over the past
few years, there is no inflation problem in the euro area, and in-
flation in Japan has been negative. There seems little chance that
any of the three large currency areas will lapse into monetary in-
stability in the future. But why should there be such volatility of
exchange rates between currencies each of which have achieved
price stability?
The volatility of exchange rates is harmful for those blocs be-
cause it aggravates instability of exchange rates, discourages trade,
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is even worse for the other countries that have substantial trade
with two or more of the three blocs. Look at the volatility of the
dollar-yen rate over the past 15 years! In 1985, the dollar was
around 250 yen. In April 1995, the dollar had fallen to 79 yen.
Then, in only three years-from April 1995 to June 1998 — the dol-
lar soared to 148 yen. Recently the dollar has flopped down again
to 105 yen. What is going on? Who gains from this volatility of
the yen-dollar rate? Hedge fund operators may gain from the
volatility but the people as a whole lose.
It is not any better when we look at the dollar-euro rate, even
though we have had only a short time to look at it — not much
more than a year. Since its inception the euro has depreciated by
more than 20% and this involves a real depreciation since price
levels in the dollar and euro areas have been stable. The prede-
cessor of the euro was the ECU (European Currency Unit) and
the mainstay of the ECU was the Deutschemark. Over the past 25
years, it does not look good. In 1975, the dollar was 3.5 marks.
Five years later, it was down to 1.7 marks. Five years later, in
1985, the dollar soared to 3.4 marks. By 1992, at the time of the
ERM crisis, the dollar flopped down below 1.4 marks, and now
the dollar is up above 2 marks.
What is going on between zones that have stable prices? This
is the major problem and defect of the international monetary sys-
tem today. Do not think for a moment that the appreciation of
the dollar over the period of 1995-1998 (combined, perhaps, with
the devaluation of remninbi in 1994) did not play a key role in
aggravating the so-called Asian IMF crisis. Volatility has become
the enemy. That is the basic subject of my Wall Street Journal pa-
per, «Threat to Prosperity».
Is volatility inevitable? There is an old saying that interven-
tion in the foreign exchange markets is useless because the daily
turnover in the foreign exchange market is so high that it would
dominate any intervention by the central banks. Well, that is just
not true. How much intervention was needed when Europe, in the
middle of 1998, decided to prepare for their monetary union by
locking bilateral exchange rates? The franc, the lira, the peseta,
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shilling, the Portuguese escudo-all the exchange rates were locked
together. There was no speculation because the market knew that
the central banks were serious about the rates and would back
them up with unlimited intervention. As a consequence, no inter-
vention was necessary!
It was also true that it was not just spot, but also future ex-
change rates that were fixed. Interest rates converged throughout
the area incredibly quickly. Is it not amazing that, for most of the
1990s up until 1997, the countries in the south of Europe, in-
cluding Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, had two digit interest
rates, 10-13%, in many cases. When they decided to form a mon-
etary union, however, interest rates converged down to about 5%,
an instant benefit for their economies and capital markets and es-
pecially for public finances of heavily-indebted countries. A fall in
interest rates lowers the interest cost of servicing the debt, and
reduces the budget deficit. A five percentage point reduction in
interest rates brings more than a five percentage point improve-
ment in the deficit/GDP percentage in a country where the
Debt/GDP ratio exceeds unity and the maturity of the public debt
averages one year or less.
Another point I want to emphasize — because it has been so
badly treated in much of the literature — is that capital move-
ments are nearly always beneficial between areas with truly fixed
exchange rates. Capital movements are in the right direction as
long as there is complete confidence in the exchange rate. You
never get bad capital movements from New York to California,
because the New York dollar is the same as the California dollar.
Nor are there bad capital movements within the European Mon-
etary Union. Capital movements go in the direction where they
yield the highest rate of return, which is the direction of efficiency.
Problems arise with capital movements only when the ex-
change rate is uncertain. For example, consider all those coun-
tries that had fixed exchange rates in the post-war period. Japan
had an absolutely fixed exchange rate of 360 Yen to the US dol-
lar from 1948 (the year of the 10-1 currency reform) until the
1970s. You never had problems of bad capital movements between
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States and Germany. Since 1948, when Germany had its 10-1 cur-
rency reform, here was a fixed exchange rate of 4.2 DM to the
dollar. In 1961, for reasons that in retrospect seem suspect, Ger-
many decided to appreciate its currency, lowering the value of the
dollar from 4.2 DM to 4.013M. That appreciation of the mark just
whetted the appetite of speculators. They thought that, now that
Germany had started to change exchange rates, it might contin-
ue. The revalorization created a great wave of capital movements
and some instability.
Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. You have the case
in 1983 when, as you know, Hong Kong adopted a currency
board. Exchange rates were set at 7.8 HK dollars to the US dol-
lars. According to many criteria, that system worked beautifully.
Until the crisis period of the late 1990s, the Hong Kong curren-
cy board was run by three commercial banks. Just before the
British left, however, they created the Hong Kong Monetary Au-
thority. Governments got into the picture and made a mess of it.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority started to talk about sup-
porting the stock market in Hong Kong, instead of following the
strict principles of a currency board. Hong Kong therefore had a
little bit of a crisis due to the inevitable uncertainty over the ex-
change rate, but it recovered quickly and it did not do much per-
manent damage. Confidence in the fixed rate was restored and,
I hope, a lesson was learned.
11 - A G-3 Monetary Union?
I want to add something now about the volatility of the rates
between the major blocs. What could be done about it? A mone-
tary union would solve the problem. Put politics aside to look at
the technical aspects of it. It will simplify things if we start from
a two country monetary union, such as that between the dollar
and yen areas, although the same principles would apply to a
union between the dollar and euro areas. How could you go about
creating a monetary union between the United States and Japan?
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and yen areas would be much easier than the monetary union
formed by the eleven countries of the euro area. Let us consider
a few of the options. The simplest would be to use an existing cur-
rency. Suppose Japan agrees to use the dollar. With its foreign ex-
change (mainly dollar) reserves approaching $400 billion, it could
simply buy up all the outstanding yen notes. The public would
have to shift the new unit of account, and to make the mental
transformation easier it would be convenient to choose an ex-
change rate of 100 yen = $1. A joint Japan-US Monetary Policy
committee would then be formed to make monetary policy much
as the US Open Market Committee makes monetary policy today.
A common agreed inflation target would have to be agreed upon,
and a common way of measuring inflation would be required,
much like Eurostat’s Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
Next, a formula for dividing seigniorage (probably in proportion
to GDP) would be needed. Finally, new paper currency notes re-
flecting the international character of the monetary union could
be considered.
It is sometimes thought that differential growth rates would
be a barrier to monetary union. What happens if growth in the
United States exceeds growth in Japan, as it has in recent years?
The effect of this on the real exchange rate would depend on
whether growth biased toward the domestic or traded goods in-
dustries. If the former, the price level of US domestic goods would
have to fall relative to Japan’s; if the latter, the reverse. But these
differentials are not likely to create problems worse than that be-
tween, say, California and New York, or Illinois and Louisiana.
What would be the gain from that monetary union? First, the
two countries would have a completely transparent pricing sys-
tem so that the «law of one price» could more completely equal-
ize prices in the United States and Japan. Second, interest rates
would come together, probably an average of existing balance in-
terest rates weighted by capital market sizes. Third, there would
be no speculative capital movements between the US and Japan
and hedge funds would no longer feed off this source of instabil-
ity. Fourth, Japan’s macroeconomic policy would fall into place;
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as it has over the past few years.
A single-currency monetary union helps to illustrate the gains
from monetary union in general. But from a practical point of
view, both countries might want to keep their own currencies. The
United States would probably not want to give up the dollar, the
most successful currency of the twentieth century and the most
important currency in the world today. Japan might not want to
give up its yen especially if the US were to keep its dollar. But
you could have a two-currency monetary union that has most of
the advantages of a single-currency monetary union. Of the many
alternative approaches, I will choose the easiest. The US is a big-
ger economy than Japan so use the dollar as the major operating
vehicle and the Federal Reserve System as the agent of the union.
Then have the Bank of Japan fix the yen to the dollar and do
nothing else. Because it is convenient numerically, let us again
make 100 yen equal 1 US dollar or 1 yen equal 1 US cent. The
yen then becomes another denomination of the dollar. You are go-
ing to have to absolutely lock in the exchange rate. The Bank of
Japan will stand ready to buy and sell dollars at 100 Yen to the
dollar. Interest rates in the two countries would converge.
All the forward rates would be fixed too. This is a «perma-
nent» deal, and you will get all the conditions of the single cur-
rency monetary union. Because of numerical coincidence, you
maintain the valuable element of transparency, the notational con-
venience, and all the things that would be associated with it. You
would then have the monetary officials from the Bank of Japan
and the United States that form the open market committee use
the indispensable common index of prices. The Fed would buy ei-
ther US or Japanese bonds to expand the money supply. The pol-
icy committee would make policy according to their best judg-
ment of how to hit their inflation targets. You would make an
arrangement to divide up the seigniorage, probably in proportion
to the GDP in the two different countries. You would then have
a two-currency monetary union with absolutely fixed exchange
rates that would operate for all practical purposes like a single
currency monetary union.
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would be applicable to a dollar-euro or a «G-3» (EMU, Japan and
the United States) monetary union. In fact even without a formal
monetary union the three areas could follow the principles I have
outlined and get some of the advantages of a monetary union, at
least in the direction of mitigating exchange rate volatility. The
principal difference from current practice is that the three central
banks would have to put aside the completely incorrect notion
that exchange rates do not matter. One sees signs that the Euro-
pean Central Bank is starting to realize that overshooting of the
euro in a downward direction builds up in the pipeline higher
prices that would be more difficult to reverse later. More atten-
tion to exchange rate targeting should at the same time involve
increased attention to monetary policy coordination to ensure that
the G-3 price level is kept under control.
12. - The Asian Crisis
The currency crisis of the late 1990s has been called the
«Asian Crisis». While attending a meeting of the APEC Study
Group Commission in Korea in March 200, I heard a new phrase:
the Asia-IMF Crisis!» Both adjectives need to be justified: Was it
an Asian crisis? Was it an IMF crisis? I mentioned the culpabili-
ty of the appreciation of the dollar against the yen as being a fac-
tor. But I myself do not like the term, the «Asian Crisis.» It was
a crisis for just a few countries. It was, of course, a crisis for Thai-
land, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea, but it was not a cri-
sis for Singapore, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Japan except in
the sense that no country can escape entirely events that affect
their neighbors.
What did those five economies that did not have a crisis have
in common? It was not fixed exchange rates. Singapore, Taiwan
and Japan had inflation targets, China had a fixed exchange rate
from 1994 to the present along currency board lines but, of course,
with exchange controls on capital account. Hong Kong had a fixed
exchange rate.
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mon was a clear-cut, specific target for monetary policy. Singa-
pore had a currency basket (with unspecified weights) target that
worked almost like inflation targeting. Hong Kong had a curren-
cy board system
8. China had a fixed exchange rate coupled with
exchange controls. Both Taiwan and Japan had commodity bas-
ket targets.
A second feature these countries all had in common was a
very large foreign exchange reserve, so they did not have to draw
on the IMF or accept outside advice. Those large foreign exchange
reserves represent a kind of protection and a warning to specula-
tors not to speculate against their currencies. To me, those two
things are principles that should be written on stone. There should
be very clear-cut, explicit and transparent targets for monetary
policy. You must have ample foreign exchange reserves, especial-
ly relative to the debt situation of the country. Higher debt situa-
tions dictate the need for high foreign exchange reserves.
Was it an IMF crisis? The IMF had programs in each of the
countries at the epicentre of the crisis, but little or no exposure
in the other countries. But this doesn’t prove causation! There are
a lot of sick people in hospitals too! A serious case, however, could
be made that IMF policies have led to the rejection of fixed ex-
change rates as an anchor without replacing that monetary rule
with an equally satisfactory alternative.
13. - Currency Areas in Asia
I now must turn to the question of currency areas in Asia.
Does Asia need a common currency. The answer depends on what
is the alternative to it. If the alternative is the present system then
my answer is «yes, Asia needs a common currency.» The present
system has serious flaws. If, however, the alternative to it is a glob-
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8 It is true that Hong Kong got into a little trouble when the newly-created
Hong Kong Monetary Authority threatened to depart from the rules of the system
in order to support the stock market, but the punishment in the form of outward
speculation was severe and the HKMA quickly corrected its mistake.al currency, which I think would be the best solution, then my
answer is Asia does not need a separate common currency.
To form an idea of the needs of Asia in the field of currency
reorganization, we need to form a view of the outlook for Asia
and its prospects in the world economy as it could conceivably
evolve. A couple of years ago I wrote an article in the Wall Street
journal outlining a plan for a world currency built on the plat-
form of a three-currency (G-3) monetary union of the dollar, eu-
ro and yen areas. You can think of achieving this end by effect-
ing the five steps leading up to the euro area (without the third
phase in which national currencies are scrapped): 1) establish a
common inflation target for the G-3 area; 2) establish a common
price index to measure inflation; 3) lock exchange rates; 4) form
a monetary policy committee to decide on the single monetary
policy; and 5) create an arrangement to share seigniorage. Given
the high degree of inflation convergence among the three curren-
cy areas, making monetary policy decisions should not be more
difficult than for the European Central Bank inside the euro area.
If that could be achieved, it would be a relatively simple matter
to use the dollar-euro-bloc as the platform for a world currency
produced by the members of the IMF.
There would be great advantages of such a monetary union
for the world economy. Instead of having to cope with unstable
exchange rates among the dollar, euro and yen, the rest of the
world would have the option of stabilizing its own currencies rel-
ative to the mainstream of the world economy.
Of course, it is possible — some might say extremely unlike-
ly — that an agreement to lock exchange rates and conduct a com-
mon monetary policy could be worked out among the United
States, the EMU countries and Japan. The day is long past when
all the major central banks — as in the post-war era — believed
in a fixed exchange rate monetary system as an act of faith. The
current fashion is to go the opposite extreme and praise policies
of benign neglect of the exchange rate. For that reason, Asia could
not count on such a large scale reform and should not reject more
practical alternatives in Asia itself. The best may be the enemy of
the better.
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in Asia. I have to say very quickly here that I do not mean a sin-
gle currency for Asia. When I speak of the desirability of a world
currency, I am not talking about a single currency. The distinction
between a common currency and a single currency has given rise
to difficulties elsewhere, so to avoid misinterpretation I want to
underline the distinction.
14. - Single- vs. Multiple-Currency Monetary Unions
Let me refer again to The Nobel Monetary Duel, my debate
with Milton Friedman. In the final episode, Friedman chastised
me for advocating a single world currency. But I have never sug-
gested a single currency for the world and, moreover, I have sev-
eral times suggested there would be problems with it. Assuming
the political conditions were appropriate, the optimal and equi-
librium solution is for each (sufficiently-large) country to retain
their national currencies but keep them fully convertible into the
world currency.
In my vision for the world economy, every country can keep
its own currency. All that is needed is for the currencies to be
produced as if there were a single currency. What model would
this be? Well, it could be the model of the Belgium-Luxembourg
monetary union. Belgium and Luxembourg formed a monetary
union in 1921. The Luxembourg franc has existed along with
the Belgium franc all this time but monetary policy was (before
the advent of the euro) conducted by Belgium. Luxembourg had
no independent monetary policy but there are nevertheless a lot
of Luxembourg francs in circulation, just as there have been
Scottish pounds kicking around since the Act of Union with
Britain in 1707. The equilibrium is stable as long as the supply
of each national currency is kept below the global demand for
it at the fixed parity by a margin large enough to discourage
speculation.
So, to get back to the main theme, Asia needs a common cur-
rency, but it is not possible or desirable for it to have a single cur-
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convertible into the common currency organized and run by a
consortium of relevant states. Such an arrangement would be
highly desirable to avoid a repetition of the currency storm that
struck several countries in Asia in 1997-1998, from which one or
two countries have not yet recovered.
Remember the meeting of the IMF in Hong Kong in Sep-
tember 1997? At that time, Japan proposed the organization of an
Asian Monetary Fund. This proposal was decisively rejected by the
United States Treasury. The fear may have been that an Asian
Monetary Fund would take decision-making power away from
Washington and that decisions away would be worse than those
made in Washington. What a pity! There followed in just a few
weeks the so-called Asian crisis. Policy responses with an Asian
solution could hardly have been worse than the solutions that em-
anated from Washington.
15. - What Anchor for an Asian Currency?
If there is to be an Asian plan — solution is too strong a word
— for an Asian currency, it is natural to ask: what currency and
what anchor? As already emphasized, the European model of a
single currency would not work in Asia now because a single cur-
rency requires a substantial degree of political integration, much
more than exists in Asia now or in the foreseeable future. The
Asian currency would have to be a common parallel currency, used
for international trade within Asia and with the rest of the world.
What would be the anchor for a parallel currency in Asia? At
least at the beginning, it would have to be based one of the ex-
isting global currencies. The relevant choices are the dollar, euro
and yen, and possibly the RMB. But the RMB would not suffice
at the present because it is not a convertible currency. If China
continues to grow as it has in the past, the RMB will be an in-
creasingly important currency in Asia, but it would be a step back-
wards to use an inconvertible currency as an anchor, and this rules
out the RMB as the anchor for the next several years.
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recently but its strengths are still legion. It has the world’s largest
creditor position, a situation it has built up with a high savings
rate that has led to huge current account surpluses. Japan also
has been more successful (one could even say too successful!)
than any other country in recent decades in keeping inflation un-
der control.
But against these advantages, the choice of the yen as anchor
has severe problems. Japan has not put its macroeconomic house
in order. A first problem is that its banking system is in grave
trouble, a problem that stemmed from the excessive appreciation
of the yen in the late 1980s. A second problem is that its mix of
monetary and fiscal policy has been wrong for several years: fis-
cal expansion coupled with a high degree of capital mobility and
a flexible exchange rate (a straightforward conclusion, if I may
say so, of the Mundell-Fleming model!). A third, related problem
concerns the secular tendency of the yen to appreciate, reflected
in long-term interest rates less than 2%. Until these problems are
corrected, the yen could not be used as the basis for a currency
area. In addition there are other difficulties, such as the percep-
tion of unfinished business left over from Japan’s role in World
War II.
Because the euro is not a serious contender as an anchor for
the Asian currency at the present, we are left with the dollar —
or a basket of the dollar, yen and euro. But a basket of the three
currencies, however, useful as a long-run unit of account, would
not make a good medium of exchange. As long as the dollar, eu-
ro and yen rates fluctuate against each other, its value would be
uncertain and it would not be an interesting anchor for the na-
tional Asian currencies.
We are left, of course, with the dollar. US GDP is, at current
exchange rates, somewhat less than 2 1/2 times that of Japan and
10 times that of China. The dollar would be an excellent anchor
for the Asian currencies. China already uses the dollar as its an-
chor as does Malaysia and of course Hong Kong.
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Let me now turn to Hong Kong. This region has become an
important feature of the economy of Southeast Asia, and outside
Tokyo Hong Kong has the largest foreign exchange market in Asia.
Even so, its policy could, in my opinion, be improved by a poli-
cy change that it would be better for itself, mainland China, the
rest of Asia and the world economy.
I am thinking of a reform that would replace Hong Kong dol-
lars with US dollars! What would be the costs and benefits?
Start with Hong Kong. There are about $HK100 billion in cir-
culation that would have to be replaced, at the current exchange
rate of $HK7.80 = $US1.00, by about US$12 billion. With Hong
Kong’s vast reserves of about $100 billion, it would be a simple
matter to finance. The only cost to Hong Kong would be the in-
terest receipts foregone on this $US12 billion. The benefits to
Hong Kong would be enormous. The Hong Kong public would
suddenly get a currency that is the most important in the world,
with a history of stability stretching over the last century, second
to none. Interest rates in Hong Kong would fall to New York lev-
els. And Hong Kong would continue to get the rate of inflation of
the United States, modified by a secular productivity-change fac-
tor. Hong Kong’s financial center would suddenly dominate the
rest of Asia.
China would benefit. The RMB has been fixed to the US dol-
lar since 1994. China would have on its doorstep a region using
the most important currency in the world and she would have ac-
cess to a world-class capital market and financial center. The con-
tinued existence of the Hong Kong dollar is completely unneces-
sary for China. Other advantages would be that Hong Kong would
become the focal point for the Asian Monetary Fund and the
«Asian dollar».
The existence of a great financial centre based on the dollar and
with dollar interest rates would be of immense benefit for the rest
of Asia. The transformation of the Hong Kong currency into a rock
of stability for all Asia would have far reaching — and beneficial —
implications for the currency reorganization of the world.
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in Asia, including China, Hong Kong and most Asian countries,
could be used as the platform for an independent Asia currency
that could become the standard unit of account of an Asian Fund.
17 – Currency Areas and Power Centers
International monetary relations straddle economics and pol-
itics. An Asian currency area cannot be considered in a political
vacuum. I have argued that a single-currency monetary union can-
not take place without a substantial degree of political integra-
tion. It must be a security area, in the sense that the states are
friends rather than enemies and not likely to make war on one
another. To a lesser extent the same argument holds for the for-
mation of currency areas and multiple-currency monetary unions.
A necessary condition for the formation of a monetary union
in Europe was the end of the Franco-German enmity that had
soured relations for two hundred years. It could not be said that
the European Union is tightly integrated politically, yet there is
nonetheless a substantial degree of governance exerted by the Eu-
ropean Commission, such groups as ECOFIN and the periodic in-
tergovernmental meetings of heads of state. The degree of politi-
cal integration is, moreover, increasing as a result of the pressure
to create a governance system that will work with the additional
accession countries.
Asia’s political integration is a long way from that of Europe.
But it is surprising how quickly it can develop if the conditions
are right. At the present time the most likely Asia currency area
would start with the «APT» (Asean plus Three) group, made up
of the (newly-expanded) ten Asean countries and Japan, Korea and
China.
Another important issue in currency area formation is the sys-
tem of governance, which is affected importantly by the relative
power positions of the states involved. It goes without saying, for
example, that the proposed North American Monetary Union com-
prising the same countries as NAFTA, would be dominated by the
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larger than Canada’s and twenty times larger than Mexico’s. Mer-
cosur is heavily dominated by Brazil, with 180 million people,
checked by Argentina, with 35 million, and the two much small-
er states of Paraguay and Uruguay.
In the APT area the dominant powers are Japan and China,
complementary to one another in political as well as economic di-
mensions. The political viability of an APT currency area would
depend critically on how well these countries got along, and on
whether or how well the other eleven countries accepted their gov-
ernance.
A key element in an APT currency area would be the choice
of an anchor. For reasons already discussed, the only feasible sin-
gle-currency anchor at the present time would be the US dollar.
The currencies of China, Hong Kong and Malaysia are already
fixed to the dollar so that if Japan were to fix the yen to the dol-




There is a gap in the world economy, an externality, that a
world currency could close. It would be highly desirable to orga-
nize an international currency that could be used as a global unit
of account and means of exchange. This currency should be giv-
en juridical status in a world constitution. A global economy needs
a global currency.
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9 It would be a mistake, however, not to recognize that the dollar itself might
not be a safe anchor in the long run. Over recent years it has been strong; in the
future it could be weak. The fluctuations of the dollar against other major cur-
rencies pose a major problem for countries adhering to the dollar alone. Over the
past 30 years the dollar has been involved in large fluctuations against the SDR.
The dollar started out as 1 SDR in 1970; it fell to an average low of SDR.76 in
1980; it rose to SDR.98 in 1985; it fell to SDR.66 in 1995 and rose to SDR .99 in
2001. While a stabilization around the dollar would be the best step in the short
run, the SDR might be a better long-run anchor. Currently the weights in the four-
currency basket SDR are as follows: Dollar— 39%; Euro = 32%; Yen = 18%; Pound
= 11%.My approach, outlined above, would be to build this world
currency on the platform of existing currencies, the dollar, euro
and yen currency areas. We may as well say the SDR, which is a
basket of these three currencies and the pound sterling, with
weights at present equal to 39% for the dollar, 32% for the euro,
18% for the yen and 11% for the pound. The weights would be
changed as the importance of the currencies evolves and as new
currencies become important.
The convening of a Bretton Woods style international mone-
tary conference would be one institutional way of implementing
the new arrangements. Yet it would be premature to begin the
process with such an arrangement. The 1944 Bretton Woods con-
ference succeeded because the fundamentals of the system had
been worked out in advance. The task at Bretton Woods was main-
ly to finalize the institutional details of a structure that was al-
ready in place and obtain the endorsement of the smaller powers.
The first order of priority would be to establish more stable
exchange rate arrangements. This could be achieved by introduc-
ing wide bands around the yen-dollar or dollar-euro rates, eventu-
ally squeezing these bands closer as experience proves them viable.
It is not necessary to establish a three-currency solution all
at once. Agreement to fix any two of the currencies would be an
inducement for the third to participate. Fixing the yen-dollar rate,
for example, could help to launch an APEC currency area com-
prising $22 trillion worth of GDP that could become an attractive
anchor for the euro as well.
Over time, an agreement could be made by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the International Monetary Fund to use the large dol-
lar-euro-yen currency area as the platform on which to build a
new international monetary system and a global currency.
Thank you very much.
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If political conditions made an Asian currency area based on the APT group
unfeasible, an alternative might be available in the larger framework of APEC.
This group, which has set a target of some kind of free trade area by 2015, com-
prises the entire Pacific Basin, including, among others, China, Japan, the United
States, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Australia, New Zealand and Chile.
Its combined GDP is over $22 trillion, over half of world GDP.